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FROM BEST INTERESTS TO BETTER INTERESTS?
VALUES, UNWISDOM AND OBJECTIVITY IN MENTAL
CAPACITY LAW
JOHN COGGON* AND CAMILLIA KONG**
ABSTRACT. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 governs personal decision-
making for adults. It incorporates five overarching principles, including
that incapacity may not be inferred merely from a person’s unwise deci-
sions and that where a person lacks capacity decisions must be made in
her best interests. Through analysis of judicial treatment of unwisdom,
best interests, subjectivity and objectivity, considered against parliamen-
tary debates on the Mental Capacity Bill and philosophical critique of
ideas of (un)wisdom, we argue that these principles are problematically
irreconcilable. The Act’s radical under-specificity means, paradoxically,
that this comes to be resolved through abstracted values, rather than the
centricity of the person herself.
KEYWORDS: mental capacity, best interests, unwise decisions, objective
values, subjective values, personal decision-making.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) provides the rules and principles in
England and Wales that govern and protect personal decision-making for
adults regarding their health, welfare and property and affairs.1 It was
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drafted with an empowering ethos, enumerating five overarching, “car-
dinal”2 principles in section 1:
1. The Principles
(1) The following principles apply for the purposes of this Act.
(2) A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established
that he lacks capacity.
(3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without
success.
(4) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely
because he makes an unwise decision.
(5) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a
person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests.
(6) Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to
whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively
achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and
freedom of action.
The MCA affirms that adults are assumed to have capacity to make decisions
for themselves. This assumption may only be displaced if, after all practicable
steps to allow a person to make a decision have been exhausted, both “func-
tional” and “diagnostic” criteria to determine incapacity are met. First, a per-
son must be shown to be unable to understand, retain, or weigh or use relevant
information, or to communicate her decision;3 second, this must be “because
of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or
brain”.4 Following a finding of incapacity, a decision maker (referred to in
the statute as “D”) then makes a decision for the person (who in these circum-
stances is referred to as “P”) which must be in P’s best interests.
This article focuses on the MCA’s third and fourth principles, enshrined
respectively in sections 1(4) and 1(5). The third principle, on which the stat-
ute provides no further explanation, guards against incapacity determina-
tions being made merely on the basis of a person’s decision being
“unwise”. The Act’s fourth principle, which does receive further elabor-
ation – in section 4 – provides a best interests standard as the basis of deci-
sions made for P. Section 4 maintains the ethos of P-centricity within best
interests decision-making: for example, by providing for P’s optimal par-
ticipation and including P’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values as relevant
factors in the decision.5
2 King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80, at [25]–[39]
(MacDonald J.); Re D (Incapacitated Person) (Representatives and Advocates: Duties and Powers)
[2016] EWCOP 49, at [82] (Baker J.).
3 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, s. 3(1).
4 Ibid., s. 2(1). The criteria as listed here are in the opposite order to that given in the statute, in accord-
ance with the logical priority of undertaking the section 3 test for capacity first, and only then and if the
section 3 test suggests incapacity, section 2: PC v City of York Council [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2014] 2
W.L.R. 1, at [58]–[59] (Macfarlane L.J.).
5 MCA, ss. 4(4), 4(6).
2 [2021]The Cambridge Law Journal
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Given its reach and ambitions, and the contextualism required for their
achievement, the MCA was understandably developed as framework legis-
lation with principles at its core. As it neared its final stages of progression
through Parliament, Baroness Barker, who had been a member of a Joint
Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons that provided
pre-legislative scrutiny to the Bill,6 explained why “we have this Bill of
principle”,7 stating:
Of necessity, this is a framework Bill. We on this side of the House do not
normally like framework Bills, but this is an exception – because it should
be. Much is left to regulations, guidance and codes of practice. . . . This is
right because in the legislation we seek to determine what will happen to mil-
lions of people whose circumstances are different. That is why it is important
that we have this Bill with those principles at the very heart of it.8
Given the MCA’s emphasis on the particular person and her circum-
stances, a lack of specificity within the legislation is thus overtly rationalised:
a foundation on particular principles may be considered a desirable – even a
necessary – legislative method to overcome challenges of bespoke applica-
tion. However, it is problematic if the principled framework is on its own
terms incoherent, or if the norms that arise through its subsequent jurispru-
dential developments lead to incoherence. This article argues that sections 1
(4) and 1(5) cause such problems. Specifically, it is argued that the inclu-
sion of unwisdom as a defining statutory principle renders problematic
the function and application of the third and fourth principles, whereby
the concept of “unwise” is used simultaneously as a shield concept to pro-
tect a person’s autonomy and as a negative counterpoint to distinguish best
interests decision-making from a person’s decision-making on her own
behalf.
It is important to understand how the unwise decisions provision renders
the MCA’s principled framing unstable. The wealth of case law since the
inception of the legislation enables us to undertake a critical assessment
of whether the statute and its judicial application have properly met pur-
ported objectives of promoting P-centricity and P-specificity. Despite the
P-centric interpretation of best interests in the Supreme Court’s judgment
in Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James,9 the
House of Lords Select Committee Report on the MCA in 2014 had
observed failures in implementing the empowering ethos of the Act, attrib-
utable partly to “[t]he concept of unwise decision-making fac[ing] institu-
tional obstruction due to prevailing cultures of risk-aversion and
6 Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, vol. 1 (London 2003).
7 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 22 (10 January 2005).
8 Ibid. See also the explicit endorsement of Baroness Ashton, then parliamentary under-secretary of state
at the Department of Constitutional Affairs, at HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 98 (10 January 2005).
9 [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] A.C. 591.
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paternalism” and leading more generally to best interests decision-making
“often not [being] undertaken in the way set out in the Act: the wishes,
thought and feelings of P are not routinely prioritised”.10 Whilst the
Select Committee identified institutional failures in enacting the objectives
of the MCA, what is less recognised is how incoherence at the level of the
statute’s principled foundation may obstruct the implementation of
P-centric decision-making. In theory, specific provisions in section 4
would appear to shore up the importance of P-centricity, but these provi-
sions are sometimes treated as supplementary obligations,11 generating
the need to explore the more fundamental cause for person-centredness
to go by the wayside in best interests decision-making through a critical
examination of the MCA’s principled framing in section 1. Contradictory
interpretations of section 1 principles lay bare an unstable conceptual
grounding and articulation of P-centricity, such that this statutory objective
is in danger of inevitably becoming meaningless in both substantive content
and practical application.
This article therefore has a critical, diagnostic purpose – to illuminate
two possible reasons for the incoherence at the principled foundation of
the MCA. The first is contextual: an account of parliamentary debates on
protecting unwise decisions in Section II of this paper helps highlight a rad-
ical distinction between the Government’s interpretation of (what was to
become) section 1(4)’s implications, as contrasted with subsequent judicial
analysis of it. As Section III shows, judicial interpretation has led to a fun-
damental irreconcilability between sections 1(4) and 1(5), pitting the
unwise decision principle and best interests standard in contradistinction
with one another. Particular problems arise because of inconsistencies
regarding the place of unwisdom within best interests; not least that best
interests assessments – rooted in concepts and cognates of wisdom – can
be seen to impinge on determinations of and around (in)capacity.
The second reason is conceptual, in so far as the idiosyncratic operatio-
nalisation of “unwise” in the MCA departs from a more intuitive, normative
concept of wisdom. Our argument shows how the phrase “unwise decision”
in the statute denotes an unusual meaning. It was intended to act as a guard
against presumptions of incapacity; effectively to permit and protect indi-
vidual eccentricity and autonomy. The phrase, however, works simultan-
eously to preserve the validity of wisdom as an ideal against which best
interests decisions are evaluated. Appeals to wise/unwise presuppose
broad agreement on the normative desirability of wisdom in decision-
making, or at least recognise the force of normative intuitions associated
with both ordinary and philosophical understandings of the term. Where
10 HL Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative
Scrutiny (London 2014), ch. 3, at [104].
11 See e.g. University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v ED [2020] EWCOP 18.
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unwise decisions are excluded from decisions made for P, there is a ten-
dency to look to distinct duties towards P and to relate the rationalisations
to values that are objective rather than subjective. Section IV critically
explains judicial approaches to the objective/subjective distinction which
do not straightforwardly track parliamentary intentions to protect P from
D’s subjective values, aiming rather – or in addition – to deny the weight
of P’s own subjective values. We argue that the underlying theoretical roots
of judicial approaches can be traced back to a more normative Aristotelian
conception of wisdom that fundamentally conflicts with the liberal and sub-
jectivist framing in section 1(4). By implication, wisdom/unwisdom come
to be understood in ways that are either too “thick” or demanding, or too
“thin” or normatively impoverished. We conclude that a focus on (un)wis-
dom is conceptually unstable in itself, making it problematic when set as a
reference against which other principles may be assessed (especially protec-
tion of best interests) and the overall person-centred aims of the MCA.
Though we do not provide a resolution to the instability in the statute’s
principles, our analysis is vital to spur on much-needed internal as opposed
to external critical reflection,12 where examination of the MCA on its own
terms reveals a significant divergence between the statute’s principled bases
and its objectives of promoting P-centricity and P-specificity in best inter-
ests decision-making.13
12 Few works have critically assessed the principles of the MCA against the intent of the legislation.
Prominent examples of external critiques assess the MCA from particular interpretations of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), particularly the
CRPD Committee’s “General Comment No. 1 (2014) – Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the
Law” (CRPD/C/GC/1, 2014). See also P. Bartlett, “At the Interface Between Paradigms: English
Mental Capacity Law and the CRPD” (2020) 11 Frontiers in Psychiatry 881; N. Crowther and
L. Sayce OBE, “Was Ratification of the CRPD the High Watermark for United Kingdom Disability
Rights? Ten Years of Monitoring Implementation of the CRPD” in E.J. Kakoullis and K. Johnson
(eds.), Recognising Human Rights in Different Cultural Contexts (Singapore 2020), 297–332. For cri-
tiques from an internal, albeit more conceptual, perspective, see C. Kong, Mental Capacity in
Relationship: Decision-making, Dialogue, and Autonomy (Cambridge 2017); P. Skowron, “The
Relationship Between Autonomy and Adult Mental Capacity in the Law of England and Wales”
(2019) 27 Med.L.R. 32. Recent work has also provided a retrospective perspective of how the MCA
is functioning around disputes of capacity: see A. Ruck Keene et al., “Taking Capacity Seriously?
Ten Years of Mental Capacity Disputes before England’s Court of Protection” (2019) 62
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 56.
13 Best interests decision-making has also been interpreted and evaluated against the CRPD emphasis on
supported decision-making: see R. Harding and E. Taşcıog ̆lu, “Supported Decision-making from
Theory to Practice: Implementing the Right to Enjoy Legal Capacity” (2018) 2 Societies 25;
L. Series, “Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and Support Paradigms”
(2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80; G. Richardson, “Mental Disabilities
and the Law: From Substitute to Supported Decision-making?” (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems
333; R. Barton-Hanson, “Reforming Best Interests: The Road Towards Supported
Decision-making’ (2018) 40 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 277. Important as these discus-
sions are, we do not make the claim that the P-centric objective of the MCA is necessarily coextensive
with supported decision-making; indeed, the concept of unwise/wise putatively falls away if one pre-
sumes the primacy of enacting P’s subjective wishes through a supported decision-making framework.
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II. RATIONALISING AND FRAMING UNWISE DECISION-MAKING RIGHTS AND
BEST INTERESTS IN THE MENTAL CAPACITY BILL
Parliamentary debates on the unwise decisions and best interests provisions
give a crucial backdrop to understanding how these concepts have informed
and shaped mental capacity jurisprudence. The final stages of the Mental
Capacity Bill’s passage through Parliament are especially instructive.
They took place against the context of the Government pushing to pass
the legislation prior to Parliament’s dissolution before the general election
of May 2005. However, the overall law reform efforts leading up to the
enactment of the MCA may be seen as a 15-year long process, including
a Law Commission inquiry, Government consultation, policy statement
and pre-legislative scrutiny of the 2003 Draft Mental Incapacity Bill by
the Joint Committee referred to above.14
The debates taken as a whole tended towards a preponderant focus on
euthanasia; notwithstanding that the Bill would have a far broader reach
and application than end-of-life decision-making. As stated by Lord
Falconer, then secretary of state for constitutional affairs and Lord
Chancellor: “The Bill seeks to do much more than deal with the issue of
decisions concerning the giving of life-sustaining treatment to adults who
lack capacity. . . . I very much hope that the other issues the Bill covers
do not get obscured by these issues.”15
Of central relevance to this paper are the characterisations of and rationa-
lisations for distinct ways of conceiving and protecting/disregarding unwise
decisions and best interests. Relating to the former, David Lammy M.P.,
then parliamentary under-secretary of state for constitutional affairs, stated
that making an unwise decision is not equivalent to suffering the inability to
make a decision: “We have all done things that our family or friends think
are unwise. In a sense, the intention is to give people with impaired mental
capacity the chance to express their individuality, as everyone else does.”16
The focus is on the protection of a conception of personal autonomy; of
rights to make decisions – wise or unwise – without interference. Joan
Humble M.P., who had been a member of the Joint Committee on the
Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, reiterated Lammy’s interpretation in an
exchange with Meg Munn M.P.:
My honourable friend and I could make an unwise decision and people could
say, “Why did they do that? I don’t agree with them.” We have to recognise
14 The influence of these on the legislation is recounted in P. Letts, “Mental Capacity Act 2005: The
Statutory Principles and Best Interests Test” (2005) Journal of Mental Health Law 150. On the unwise
decisions provision, Letts concludes, “Some caution may therefore need to be applied in operating this
principle in practice”, at [154]. This relates especially to concerns raised by Denzil Lush (discussed
below), who was Master of the Court of Protection at the time Letts was writing.
15 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 13 (10 January 2005). Such points were made in both Houses, e.g. Paul Burstow
M.P.: HC Deb. vol. 425 cols. 47–48 (11 October 2004).
16 HC Deb. vol. 425, cols. 25–26 (11 October 2004).
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that the individuals covered by the Bill will also sometimes make unwise deci-
sions. The independent advocacy service might well simply say that, although
it might seem unwise to everyone else in the room, Mr. X – or P, in the ter-
minology of the Bill – actually wants to make that decision. We have to allow
them to make unwise decisions.17
This approach is also evident in the House of Lords, with Baroness Ashton,
then parliamentary under-secretary of state at the Department for
Constitutional Affairs, noting that: “The question of whether something is
unwise is debatable. . . . But could a noble Lord who has never made an
unwise decision please stand up? It is part and parcel of being
autonomous.”18
The Government’s rationale for the unwise decisions principle thus
emphasises a particular conception of autonomy. Presented as being of fun-
damental importance, autonomy is interpreted here as a thin value; a person
deciding for herself is what matters, rather than the quality of her decision-
making. This “liberal” interpretation of unwise decisions was challenged in
the debates for its express inattention to the substance of the decision itself.
Amongst the objections, two warrant explicit mention. First is Lord
Brennan’s proposed amendment to qualify the unwise decisions principle
in the following terms:
but any decision, whether unwise or not, is inapplicable and invalid it if is –
(a) wholly irrational in the opinion of the medical practitioner responsible
for the treatment, or any other decision maker including a court;
(b) in all the circumstances against the public interest, namely –
(i) to preserve life;
(ii) to prevent suicide;
(iii) to protect the integrity of the medical and nursing professions; and
(iv) to protect innocent third parties.19
This is startling for its aim to disregard protections of thin conceptions of
autonomy; allowing for instances where autonomy might be outweighed
and introducing “matters which any expression of common sense – any
sentiment of the best interests and common good of society – would
want in the Bill”.20 Society “should not be saddled with the consequences
of wholly irrational decisions” meaning we should challenge the position
that “personal autonomy should apply, even if that autonomy has been
expressed wholly irrationally”.21
17 Ibid., col. 74.
18 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 1180 (25 January 2005).
19 Ibid., cols. 1143–4.
20 Ibid., col. 1144.
21 Ibid., col. 1145.
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Lord Brennan’s amendment was not passed. Of relevance here is part of
Lady Barker’s response which emphasised that “perhaps the paramount
principle [of the Bill] is that people must be treated as individuals”.22
Another notable objection to the Bill’s protections of unwise decisions
came from Lord Christopher, who emphasised the problems of focusing
excessively on life and death cases. Drawing from comments made by
the then Master of the Court of Protection (CoP), Denzil Lush,23 Lord
Christopher favoured a pushback against the Government’s position. He
challenged the Bill’s focus on individual decisions, with its consequent
blindness to the aggregate effect of successive unwise decisions. Rather
than noting the importance of permitting unwise decisions for persons
who are deemed to lack capacity, he stressed the idea of “wholly irrational”
applying to instances where no incapacity determination has been made in
the context of financial decision-making.24
Against these (and other) challenges, the prevailing rationale for the final
framing of section 1(4) reveals that the phrase “unwise decisions” was
intended to defend against setting a higher standard of conduct for persons
with disabilities than applies to others: those with impaired capacity should
be able to express themselves in ways consistent with a liberal commitment
to value pluralism, individuality and subjective free expression. “Unwise”
is delinked from standards of objectivity and instead viewed as a constitu-
tive feature of autonomy. The legislative intent behind unwise decisions
was clear: to guard against value-laden judgments in capacity assessments
that would disqualify the idiosyncratic decision-making of persons with
disabilities.25
But does this liberal interpretation of unwise decisions likewise apply to
the best interests standard? Here the second reading debate in the House of
Lords is equally illuminating in its ambiguous appeal to “objectivity” in
best interests decision-making.26 Objectivity within the context of what
became sections 1(5) and 4 of the MCA is predominantly understood as
considering all relevant factors (including those that may be independent
of P’s own views), often evoking a sense of making a decision independent
of or impartial to a particular subjective perspective and set of values.
Objectivity thus turns on an intellectual and attitudinal orientation towards
the decision, which then itself becomes a constitutive feature of the “best”
decision. A potential wedge between what is the “better” best interests deci-
sion and the unwise viewpoint of P is the logical consequence: an interpret-
ation that appears consistent, for example, with the explanatory notes to the
22 Ibid., col. 1155.
23 See D. Lush, “The Mental Capacity Act and the New Court of Protection” (2005) Journal of Mental
Health Law 31.
24 See HL Deb. vol. 668 cols. 1162–3 (25 January 2005).
25 Also Lush, “The Mental Capacity Act and the New Court of Protection”, 33.
26 HL Deb. vol. 668 cols. 11–26 (10 January 2005).
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MCA,27 with Lady Hale’s decision in Aintree v James,28 and with former
Senior Judge Lush’s framing,29 all discussed in Section III, below.30
Yet a reading of the House of Lords’ debate reveals a departure from this
conventional interpretation. Objectivity is used as a concept that shields and
safeguards P from the imposition of D’s subjective values. In this alterna-
tive, if slightly inchoate interpretation, objectivity forces a conceptual
wedge between best interests and the subjective viewpoint of D, and not
necessarily between best interests and P’s unwise/subjective decisions.31
For example, Lord Falconer stated (in a point focused on removing or with-
holding life-sustaining treatment; the most heated issue within the parlia-
mentary debates on the Bill) that the decision maker “must make an
objective assessment” of best interests, which means that the “decision can-
not simply be the personal value judgment of the decision-maker” whereby
the decision maker wrongfully puts herself in P’s position.32 Reiterating the
importance of P’s perspective, Lord Falconer affirmed the P-centric inten-
tion of the best interests test so as to “ensur[e] that the person himself is the
focus and driver of all decision-makers”.33
Baroness Ashton echoed this meaning of objectivity as protecting P
against D’s subjective views rather than the subjective (and potentially
unwise) views of P herself: “Our determination is to ensure that the best
interest clause in the Bill is truly objective and that the decision makers’
personal desire plays no part in that.”34 The intention behind objectivity
as a standard in best interests is given within these framings as protecting
P against the potential infiltration of a third-party decision maker’s subject-
ive views, ensuring that P-centric decisions are enacted.
Tracing the genealogy of the phrase “unwise decisions” and the object-
ivity standard in parliamentary debates thereby brings into sharp relief a
focus on individuality and subjective freedom in legislative intent. In
Baroness Ashton’s words: “it is important that we enable people to make
decisions that we consider to be unwise.”35 Important to note too is that
the drafting of section 1(4) does not require unwisdom to be considered
at all in approaching best interests: although unwisdom should not be the
basis of a determination of incapacity, it does not follow that it may, less
still should, be a standard to feature in or be contrasted against best interests
27 See “Explanatory Notes: Mental Capacity Act 2005”, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2005/9/notes (last accessed 17 March 2021).
28 [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] A.C. 591.
29 See especially text to note 74, below.
30 Consider in the same vein the framing of objective versus subjective in, e.g., M. Donnelly, “Best
Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005” (2009) 17 Med.L.R. 1.
31 Cf. J. Coggon, “Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests: An Argument for Conceptual and
Practical Clarity in the Court of Protection” (2016) 24 Med.L.R. 396.
32 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 15 (10 January 2005).
33 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 16 (10 January 2005).
34 HL Deb. vol. 668 col. 99 (10 January 2005).
35 Ibid.
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decisions (nor is it mentioned in section 4 where that standard is further
explicated). The debates considered here place emphasis on installing
mechanisms to protect P’s autonomy. As shown in the remainder of this
paper, the liberal interpretation of “unwise” within parliamentary debates
runs counter to a more normative conception of wisdom that provides a
latent backdrop to judicial approaches to MCA cases, leading to clear inter-
pretive tensions and ambiguities regarding the permissibility of unwise
decisions in best interests.
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PERSONAL DECISION-MAKING: PERSONAL
VALUES AND THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN “SUBJECTIVE” VERSUS “OBJECTIVE”
A. The Clear Rule for Persons with Capacity and the Less Clear Rule for
Those Who Are Deemed to Lack Capacity
The parliamentary debates considered above show clear attempts to extend
and protect the subjective autonomy of persons with disabilities, particu-
larly in their making idiosyncratic choices. This normative aspiration was
expressed through a liberal interpretation of unwise decisions that did not
necessarily hinge on drawing a sharp distinction between the person with
or without capacity. Yet the practice and interpretation of the MCA have
followed a more ambiguous line. The main trend has been towards ascrib-
ing the right to make autonomous (including unwise) decisions as correla-
tive to a duty of non-interference towards the capacitous individual.
However, the best interests obligations to those lacking capacity are
taken to demand greater scrutiny of the substance and weight of P’s subject-
ive values.
To explain this, English mental capacity law can be observed as holding
twin, and potentially antagonistic,36 aims: promoting autonomy rights and
ensuring protection from physical, psychological, emotional and financial
harm. In the Supreme Court case of Aintree v James,37 Baroness Hale
holds:
A person who has the capacity to decide for himself can of course make deci-
sions which are not in his own best interests and no doubt frequently does so.
Indeed, the Act provides that a person is not to be treated as unable to make a
decision simply because he makes an unwise one: section 1(4). But both at
common law and under the Act, those who act or make decisions on behalf
of a person who lacks capacity must do so in his best interests: section 1(5).38
This is a precise and clear representation of capacity law: interference with
a capacitous adult’s personal, self-regarding decision is impermissible,
36 Cf. Lush, “The Mental Capacity Act and the New Court of Protection”; M. Dunn and C. Foster,
“Autonomy and Welfare as Amici Curiae” (2010) 18 Med.L.R. 86.
37 [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] A.C. 591.
38 Ibid., at [23].
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however unwise, unreasonable, rash or irrational it may be.39 A person may
be free to divest herself of all her wealth, or harm herself physically, emo-
tionally or psychologically, without rhyme or reason. As Lord Donaldson
M.R. states in the landmark refusal of medical intervention case, Re T40:
An adult patient who . . . suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to
choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered. . . . This
right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sens-
ible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.41
Consistently with Lord Donaldson’s dicta, the MCA’s explanatory notes
state:
[A] person is not to be treated as lacking capacity to make a decision simply
because he makes an unwise decision. This means that a person who has the
necessary ability to make the decision has the right to make irrational or eccen-
tric decisions that others may not judge to be in his best interests . . ..
Everything done, or decision made, under the Act for a person who lacks cap-
acity must be done in that person’s best interests.42
Again, the contradistinction between decision-making by persons who have
capacity and for persons who lack capacity is apparently clear. The guiding
principle of individual autonomy for persons who have capacity may
accordingly be represented in crisp terms:43 it is up to her what happens.44
The exercise of respecting and protecting the capacitous person’s autonomy
obtains, in principle at least, not in identifying values to motivate a deci-
sion, less still in the endorsement of such values. Rather, respecting auton-
omy within this framing means assuring the conditions for a person to act
on her decision howsoever it may be founded.45
This “thin” idea of autonomy, which permits for “unwise” decisions, is
commonly placed in judicial reasoning as necessarily oppositional to a
more substantive and “objective” standard to explain decisions that are
made under the best interests standard. McFarlane L.J., for example, in
PC v City of York Council,46 expresses how protections of unwise
39 Subject to constraints, for example, as found in the Mental Health Act 1983.
40 [1992] Fam 95.
41 Ibid., at 102, emphasis added.
42 See “Explanatory Notes: Mental Capacity Act 2005”, at [20].
43 Albeit within the necessary constraints on action provided, for example, by limits on positive claims to
public resources, criminal and civil liabilities for harms to others and their interests, and so on:
J. Coggon and J. Miola, “Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-Making” [2011] C.L.J. 523;
Coggon, “Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests”.
44 See e.g. MacDonald J. in King’s College Hospital v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80, at [97].
45 The claim in this sentence holds in principle, given the combined protection of a person’s freedom to
make an unwise decision in section 1(4) and the value-empty functional test for (in)capacity in section 3
(1); in practice values do nonetheless feature, particularly in assessments of P’s exercise of weighing
and balancing information, casting doubt as to whether principle and practice always align.
46 [2013] EWCA Civ 478.
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decisions, with a blindness to their outcomes, reflects an opposition of the
principles in sections 1(4) and 1(5):
The individual’s decision may be said to be “against the better judgment” of
the woman concerned, but the point is that, unless they lack mental capacity to
make that judgment, it is against their better judgment. It is a judgment that
they are entitled to make. The statute respects their autonomy so to decide
and the Court of Protection has no jurisdiction to intervene.
[T]here is a space between an unwise decision and one which an individual
does not have the mental capacity to take and . . . it is within that space that
an individual’s autonomy operates.47
Lewison L.J. echoes the position: “adult autonomy is such that people are
free to make unwise decisions, provided that they have the capacity to
decide.”48 We have a firm distinction, notwithstanding – as noted above –
that section 4 makes no mention of “unwise” or its logical exclusion.
Strikingly, despite the elaboration in section 4, the best interests standard
is by design legislated without the substantive content that is necessary to
give it meaning. As the MCA’s explanatory notes state: “Given the wide
range of acts, decisions and circumstances that the Act will cover, the
notion of ‘best interests’ is not defined in the Act. Rather, [s. 4(2)]
makes clear that determining what is in a person’s best interests requires
a consideration of all relevant circumstances.”49
Best interests is thus explained by reference not to a positive concept of
(say) welfare (or indeed wisdom), but by negative reference to what a best
interests determination is not based on: not “merely on a person’s age,
appearance, or unjustified assumptions about what might be in a person’s
best interests based on the person’s condition or behaviour”,50 not “any
unjustified and prejudicial assumptions”.51 Equally, it is not a standard
that is established by deciding as the person herself would: “Best interests
is not a test of ‘substituted judgment’ (what the person would have wanted),
but rather it requires a determination to be made by applying an objective
test as to what would be in the person’s best interests.”52
The explanatory notes describe the MCA as “offering further guidance”53
on best interests to that found at common law. But the positive steps
explained in section 4 are represented as suggested here; by reference to
negative counterpoints.54 The guidance becomes so broad and contingent
47 Ibid., at [53]–[54].
48 Ibid., at [64].
49 “Explanatory Notes: Mental Capacity Act 2005”, at [28].
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., emphases added.
53 Ibid.
54 Notably, section 1(4) is itself built on a triple negative: “A person is not to be treated as unable to make
a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision” (emphases added).
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that it could not be much wider open, apparently reflecting the intention
(rather than an accident) of statutory drafting.
It might therefore be hoped that reported cases provide a clearer expos-
ition on best interests; or at least some positive indications of what best
interests means, and how the values that guide a decision should be iden-
tified and applied. This is especially so given both that the statute “builds
on the common law”55 and that well over a decade’s worth of authoritative
interpretations of the Act have accumulated. There is, however, at once a
wide-reaching body of jurisprudence, and a position wherein precedent is
expressly provided as having no significant value. In the Court of Appeal
case of RB v Brighton and Hove City Council,56 Jackson L.J., with
whom Arden and Fulford L.J.J. agree, reflects on the lack of application
of precedent and the nature of statutory construction in mental capacity law:
The cases which arise for decision under Part 1 of the MCA . . . tend to be
acutely difficult, not admitting of any obviously right answer. The task of
the court is to apply the statutory provisions, paying close heed to the language
of the statute. Nevertheless, as judges tread their way through this treacherous
terrain, it is helpful to look sideways and see how the courts have applied those
statutory provisions to other factual scenarios. This has nothing to do with
either the doctrine of precedent or the principles of statutory interpretation.
The purpose is simply to see how other judicial decisions have exposed the
issues or attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable.57
His Lordship thus refers to previous cases only for the purpose suggested
above, whilst indicating that the “relevant principles are all to be found
set out with clarity in the MCA”.58 This may be true, but we might question
the clarity on how the principles should be interpreted and applied. The
explanatory notes themselves indicate section 4’s indeterminacy and
incompleteness: “All the relevant circumstances, including [and thus not
limited to] the factors mentioned in the section must be considered [and
thus appropriately identified], but none carries any more weight or priority
than another. . . . The factors in this section do not provide a definition of
best interests and are not exhaustive.”59
The resultant position is that decision-makers must exercise their own
judgment in identifying each matter that is relevant, according weight to
it and weighing it up against all other relevant factors. The law by design
gives limited guidance on how this should work. And the logic of this is
embraced in RB, thereby disregarding concerns about apparent conflicts
55 “Explanatory Notes: Mental Capacity Act 2005”, at [28].
56 [2014] EWCA Civ 561, [2014] C.N. 854.
57 Ibid., at [40], emphasis added.
58 Ibid., at [61], emphasis added. The discussion of precedent forms a response to Hedley J.’s comments
about conflicting judicial reasoning across five potentially relevant cases: see A Local Authority v H
[2012] EWHC 49 (COP), [2012] 1 F.C.R. 590, at [18]–[19].
59 “Explanatory Notes: Mental Capacity Act 2005”, at [28], emphases added. Judges have reaffirmed this
point: e.g. Re M (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam), [2011] 1 W.L.R. 344, at [32] (Munby J.).
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between reasoning in different judgments:60 the limited utility of the case
law is acknowledged as a necessary consequence of the highly fact- and
person-sensitive nature of mental capacity law. As Lady Hale states in
Aintree v James: “The courts have been most reluctant to lay down general
principles which might guide the decisions. Every patient, every case, is
different and must be decided on its own facts.”61
Overall, the law therefore holds that if a person has capacity, she deter-
mines what may or may not happen. If she lacks capacity,62 a decision is
not made by reference to what she would choose (although that may be
relevant) but by reference to best interests: an undefined, non-exhaustively
represented standard that operates without the bounds of customary
approaches to statutory construction and common law precedent. English
mental capacity law requires that we provide a necessarily distinct proced-
ural frame to decision-making by a person on her own behalf, as contrasted
with decision-making for P; it also rests on an assumption that the forensic
substance within the decision by a person on her own behalf should differ
from the decision for P. Despite the best interests standard not being fully
defined or unwise decisions being written out of it, to use Baroness Hale’s
language in Aintree, a person who has capacity can act against, or in a way
that is inconsistent with, her own best interests.
Thus, albeit latently, best interests evaluations bear on understandings of
capacitous decision-making. Equally, and also latently, unwise decisions
come to be reflected against best interests determinations. In both cases
they serve as substantive, further negative reference points, driving a con-
ceptual wedge between the decisions by and decisions for persons. This
conceptual separability may appear clear and logical. However, both for-
mally and ethically, the law’s respective rules for capacitous and incapaci-
tous persons belie a point of complexity, uncertainty and practical and
philosophical disagreement: best interests does not provide a stable,
unequivocal or uncontestably meaningful point of reference.63 There is
accordingly greater depth to explore in judicial contrapositions of auton-
omy (and unwise/subjective) against best interests (and wise/objective).
This can be understood by examining judicial reasoning on freedoms to
make unwise decisions and judges’ problematisation of making unwise
decisions on behalf of a person who lacks capacity.
60 As per the text quoted to note 57, above.
61 [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] A.C. 591, at [36]. See also Sir Mark Hedley, The Modern Judge: Power,
Responsibility and Society’s Expectations (Bristol 2016).
62 And has no binding advance decision: MCA, ss. 24–26.
63 See also S. Holm and A. Edgar, “Best Interest: A Philosophical Critique” (2008) 16 Health Care
Analysis 197; C. Kong et al., “An Aide Memoire for a Balancing Act? Critiquing the “Balance
Sheet” Approach to Best Interests Decision-making” (2020) Med.L.R. 753.
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B. Unwise Decisions, the Place of P and of D, and the Grounding of Best
Interests
The radical variety of CoP cases, the extensive reach of principles enun-
ciated in judgments (through “looking sideways”) and the phenomena of
vagueness and non-exhaustiveness embedded within the best interests
standard, mean it becomes possible to:
. Represent, through judges’ own reasoning, quite distinct substantive
characterisations of unwise decisions and best interests;
. Distinguish judicial evaluations of the (de)merits of unwise decisions; and
. Contrast reasoning in relation to their prescribed course of action on the
back of “unwise” reasoning.
We will explain each of these points in turn, developing a finer-grained
representation that will then permit a critique of tensions between sections 1
(4) and 1(5) in Section IV of this paper.
Two points of caution from judicial dicta are helpful in guiding that con-
sideration of judges’ approaches to unwise decisions and best interests. The
first emerges with the potential to conflate an unwise decision and a lack of
capacity properly to weigh and use information. District Judge Jillian Bell,
for example, criticised an expert witness in a case concerning a person’s
decision-making given his eating disorder for failing to “consider whether
any of [the applicant’s] reported actions were unwise decisions rather than
indications of lack of capacity”.64 Although in principle a clear separation
here might be desirable, the apparent unwisdom of a decision can and does
feature in evaluations of capacity.65
The second point of caution is articulated by Baker J., specifically against
inappropriate importation of the “protection imperative” that explicitly
frames child cases:66
[I]n cases of vulnerable adults, there is a risk that all professionals involved
with treating and helping that person – including, of course, a judge in the
Court of Protection – may feel drawn towards an outcome that is more protect-
ive of the adult and thus, in certain circumstances, fail to carry out an assess-
ment of capacity that is detached and objective.67
These points underscore the complexities of decision-making contexts
where value judgments differ. They simultaneously challenge the idea
64 FX v A Local Authority [2017] EWCOP 36.
65 E.g. Cohen J.’s decision in Royal Borough of Greenwich v CDM [2018] EWCOP 15, especially at [52].
66 See Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v GW [2007] EWHC 136 (Fam), [2007] 2 F.L.R. 597, at
[97].
67 PH v A Local Authority [2011] EWHC 1704 (Fam), at [16]. Cf. also Heart of England NHS Foundation
Trust v JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP), [2014] C.N. 279, at [7] (Jackson J.): “The temptation to base a
judgment of a person’s capacity upon whether they seem to have made a good or bad decision, and in
particular whether they have accepted or rejected medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided. That
would be to put the cart before the horse or, expressed another way, to allow the tail of welfare to
wag the dog of capacity.”
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that clear, distinctive and – most importantly – theoretically and practic-
ally relevant contrasts can be made between constitutive components of
(in)capacity determinations and best interests evaluations: the rules govern-
ing each may be clearly demarcated; the practical boundaries between them
may not.
Nevertheless, perhaps the strongest explication of this apparently crucial
contrast is found in Re P,68 a case regarding P’s will and the powers of his
court-appointed deputy. Having conceptualised the contours of best inter-
ests by reference to materials including the MCA’s explanatory notes, the
Law Commission’s Report on Mental Incapacity,69 the MCA Code of
Practice70 and various points of statute and jurisprudence, Lewison
J. provides a canonical statement on unwise decisions:
[A]lthough the fact that P makes an unwise decision does not on its own give
rise to any inference of incapacity (section 1(4)), once the decision making
power shifts to a third party (whether carer, deputy or the court) I cannot
see that it would be a proper exercise for a third party decision maker con-
sciously to make an unwise decision merely because P would have done so.
A consciously unwise decision will rarely if ever be made in P’s best
interests.71
Lush J., former Senior Judge in the CoP, has approvingly cited these dicta,
whose impetus directly reflects representations that he made leading up to
the enactment of the MCA.72 Lush J.’s primary concerns related to property
and affairs cases, where he has expanded on the shape and rationale for the
basis of decision-making for persons who lack capacity. In Re Buckley,73
on the matter of investments made under a lasting power of attorney, his
approach to D’s and P’s subjectivity differs from the prevalent rationale pre-
sented above in the parliamentary debates:
There are two common misconceptions when it comes to investments. The
first is that attorneys acting under an LPA can do whatever they like with
the donors’ funds. And the second is that attorneys can do whatever the donors
could – or would – have done personally, if they had the capacity to manage
their property and affairs. Managing your own money is one thing. Managing
someone else’s money is an entirely different matter.74
The judge notes that capacitous persons “are generally not accountable to
anyone” and “are entitled to make unwise decisions” about their
68 Re P [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch), [2010] 2 W.L.R. 253.
69 Law Commission, Report on Mental Incapacity.
70 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005 – Code of Practice (London 2007).
71 Re P [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch), at [42], emphasis added.
72 See Lord Christopher’s speech, reflecting on a submission that Lush J., as Master of the Court of
Protection, made to the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Mental Capacity Bill: HL Deb.
vol. 668 col. 61 (10 January 2005). See also Letts, “Mental Capacity Act 2005”.
73 [2013] EWHC 2965 (COP), [2013] C.N. 1460.
74 Ibid., at [20]–[21].
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money.75 When, however, another party is making the decision, Lush
J. holds that the situation differs: first, because of fiduciary duties towards
P; second, because the requirement to decide in P’s best interests is analyt-
ically distinct and therefore calls for reasoning according to its own stan-
dards.76 This approach to unwise decisions might be thought limited just
to property and affairs.77 However, while Lewison J.’s reasoning has
been predominantly cited in such cases, it has been referred to approvingly
in health and welfare decisions as judges have “looked sideways” across the
MCA’s diversity of practical application.78
Nevertheless, challenges to the idea of a sharp distinction between
unwise/capacitous and wise/best interests becomes apparent through rea-
soning such as in Briggs v Briggs.79 Charles J. holds in a section of his
judgment entitled “background law and principles”:
[T]he law provides that patients who have capacity to make decisions about
their medical treatment, and so who are in a position to exercise their auton-
omy or right of self-determination in respect of their treatment:
i) can choose to have or not to have the medical treatment that is on offer to
them,
ii) that choice determines the lawfulness of the treatment, and so
iii) if those patients agree to have it the treatment is lawful, but
iv) if they refuse to have it the treatment is unlawful and cannot be given
lawfully however strongly the treating doctors or others may disagree
with that patient’s choice.
Their determinative choice represents their conclusion on what promotes their
own best interests.80
Charles J. distinguishes factors that feature in decision-making for capacitous
and incapacitous persons, expressing how it is not the case that “a conclusion
on what the relevant patient would have wanted and done if of full capacity is
determinative of his best interests having regard to all relevant circum-
stances”.81 Nevertheless, his characterisation of decision-making for capaci-
tous persons pushes it into the same conceptual arena as best interests
judgments that just happen to be made by a third party: by implication,
unwise decisions are just about P’s own values that others might not
agree with. The practical distinction within this framing is more about
75 Ibid., at [22].
76 Ibid., at [23]–[26]. See also Re RG [2015] EWCOP 66, [2015] C.O.P.L.R. 794, especially at [38]–[39].
77 Cf. Mary Donnelly, “Determining Best Interests Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005” (2011) 19 Med.
L.R. 304.
78 See Re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2011] EWHC 2443
(Fam), [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1653, at [81] (Baker J.); NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 4313 (Fam), at [118]–
[119] (Moylan J.).
79 Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53, [2017] 4 W.L.R. 37.
80 Ibid., at [10], emphasis added.
81 Ibid., at [22].
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whose or which values better determine a person’s interests, rather than
the process either being or not being made on the best interests standard.82
Although this apparently cuts against Lady Hale’s dicta cited above, the
juridical background to Charles J.’s deliberations is the highly P-centric
decision in Aintree v James and its broad approach to understanding wel-
fare.83 In a passage to which many CoP judges refer, Lady Hale holds:
[I]n considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular
time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just
medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the
medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success;
they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely
to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient
and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and
they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare,
in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.84
Though Lady Hale distinguishes a person’s own capacitous decision and
D’s best interests decision, this reasoning (including in cases such as
Briggs) has promoted according much greater weight to P’s particular
values and to assuring a broad understanding of welfare. Aintree has, in the-
ory, reduced the conceptual wedge which has traditionally delineated subject-
ive wishes and feelings as opposed to objective best interests (i.e. decisions
by as opposed to for a person) in many pre- and early-MCA cases. In their
post-legislative scrutiny of the MCA, the House of Lords Select Committee
Report interpreted Aintree as “placing greater emphasis on the role of P in the
best interests process while simultaneously diminishing the importance of
objective criteria”.85 Hayden J. also recently held in the CoP:
There is now a raft of case law . . . which illustrate the efforts the Court of
Protection will got to in order to identify what the likely wishes of P would
be . . .. Whilst the identified wishes of P will not in and of themselves be deter-
minative, they will always be given substantial weight and are highly likely to
be reflected in the order or declaration the Court makes.86
Developments in case law since Aintree seem to suggest initially an appar-
ent shift towards greater determinative weight being given to P’s values in a
best interests decision, especially compared to pre- and early-MCA cases.
That said, the strength of the movement in this direction might be tracked
differently within the history of (mental) health and welfare law as con-
trasted with property and affairs. Furthermore, even with recognition of
general trends, such developments have not made notions of objective
82 Cf. Coggon, “Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests”.
83 [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] A.C. 591.
84 Ibid., at [39], emphases added.
85 See note 10, ch. 3, at [99].
86 Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust v R [2020] EWCOP 4, [2020] 4 W.L.R. 96, at [33].
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assessment disappear altogether in best interests decision-making. This is
seen clearly through rejections of unwise (or irrational, unreasonable,
eccentric, etc.) subjective decision-making in favour of various place-
holders for more idealised, purportedly objective values in recent cases,
as exemplified in the appeal to a hypothetically conceived person with cap-
acity (who never existed) in University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation
Trust v ED, or reference to a “window of lucidity” in A Clinical
Commissioning Group v AF & Ors.87 Indeed, we need to probe more deeply
what appears to be motivating this overly simplistic dichotomy of subjective
and objective considerations. In order to do so, the prism of unwise deci-
sions permits a closer scrutiny of questions of non-P-centricity, as discussed
in Section IV and enables us to challenge the view that the principled confl-
icts between sections 1(4) and 1(5) are reducible to separable autonomy-
promoting and welfare-promoting components respectively.88
IV. CONCEPTUAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICAL
WISDOM IN JUDICIAL RATIONALISATIONS
A. Digging Deeper: Unwise Decisions and Their Judicial Rationalisation
Mental capacity jurisprudence presents ranging implicit and explicit character-
isations of unwise decisions. Improved grasp of these helps explain the relative
weight that is given to P’s values, beliefs, wishes and feelings in best interests
determinations, and the overall links and tensions in judicial approaches to the
principles in sections 1(4) and 1(5). As we have argued, variation in judges’
reasoning is unsurprising. An initial liberal framing would aim with section 1
(4) to protect a thin conception of autonomy, as consistent with views expressed
in the parliamentary debates: the provision then might be said to shun rather
than invite substantive analysis of the meaning of (un)wisdom. However, scru-
tiny of judicial rationalisation around unwise decisions reveals a conceptual
grounding in substantive criteria associated with practical reasoning and deci-
sional outcomes. This in turn indicates that tensions within the law go beyond
mere case context-specificity and legislative indeterminacy. There are different
ways in which P’s values – even ones that she demonstrably espouses – can be
treated as inferior to other values that might motivate a putatively “better” deci-
sion. Analysis of the case law suggests three particular bases for this:
(1) The decision itself can be placed within its own bounded rationality
that imposes its own wisdoms on what should be done.
(2) The outcome of the decision is offensive to a concept of welfare
whose rigour is sufficiently compelling that this rules out the decision
itself as wrong.
87 [2020] EWCOP 16.
88 Cf. e.g. Lush, “The Mental Capacity Act and the New Court of Protection”.
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(3) The outcome of the decision is offensive to a concept of welfare
whose rigour is sufficiently strong that it should be treated as having
strong presumptive weight. The burden of breaking its presumptive
weight requires, for example, formalities to be followed, or a clear,
internally-coherent alignment of P’s values, wishes, beliefs and feel-
ings that offend the concept of welfare in this sense.
These three share a common justificatory grounding which treats P’s
values as essentially wrong because they are “objectively” problematic.
They appeal to some higher-order truth about P’s interests quite regardless
of her – or any other person’s – wishes, beliefs, values and feelings. We
examine each in turn.
1. The nature of the decision imposes a particular rationality
The MCA builds on rationales for adopting a functional, decision-specific
approach to understanding capacity, as contrasted with a status-based or
outcome-based approach.89 Outcome-based approaches in practice can be
seen to impact judgments about the wisdom of a decision (see Sections
IV(B) and (C), below). By contrast, the functional approach purportedly
advances a value-neutral stance which avoids basing capacity assessments
on the decision’s substance or outcome. Yet even here it is possible to see
instances of best interests decisions where the function of reasoning itself is
taken as unwise not just because of where it leads, but because of its being
considered inappropriate.
The most straightforward examples are cases such as Re P, discussed
above, where financial decisions are made for P. Lewison J.’s dicta in
that case indicate that financial decisions must be made according to an eco-
nomic rationality, even where P would not have made such decisions
according to such reasoning. As already discussed, former Senior Judge
Lush identifies two legal foundations for this: first, D owes P a fiduciary
duty; second, perhaps with some circularity, D has to serve P’s best inter-
ests. The circularity is suggested because financial decisions that are judged
to be poor on economic grounds are taken as necessarily poor decisions in
terms of what would serve P’s interests: economic rationality is taken as
analytically the better frame for best interests (i.e. better than vindicating
P’s wishes).
2. The decision itself is unwise for its outcomes for P’s welfare 1
Despite the position that capacity is not checked by reference to outcomes,
(probable) outcomes nonetheless have an impact on decisions about the
“wisdom” of a decision. This applies in cases where capacity itself is
89 Law Commission, Report on Mental Incapacity.
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under issue (albeit that, as seen above, judges warn against conflating
unwise decisions with an inability to use and weigh information) and in
cases where P’s wishes, beliefs, values and feelings are well known but
not allowed to guide a best interests determination. Cases about children
decided under the MCA are clear examples, such as An NHS Foundation
Hospital v P,90 which was heard by Baker J. P was refusing an intervention
following a paracetamol overdose. Because of the rules in capacity law
concerning children of 16 and 17 – namely meaning that the capacity,
and consequent right, to consent is not mirrored precisely by a right to
refuse91 – the judge could find a lack of capacity to refuse based on a
hard commitment to what would serve P’s welfare.
Importantly, the “welfare” component in best interests decisions concern-
ing children is broader than the standard that is applied to adults.92 Cases
such as P nonetheless bring analytical value to discussions of unwise deci-
sions because they circumscribe decisions and promote particular sorts of
determination. Such reasoning has limited best interests decisions for
adults, for example in cases regarding childbirth and reproduction, such
as NHS Trust v JP93 and The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD &
Anor.94 Though welfare is not explicitly appealed to, it nonetheless serves
as the backdrop which legitimates overruling P’s purportedly unwise
wishes, which were clearly known in both cases. NHS Trust v JP concerned
how JP’s baby would be delivered. Based on the least worst option,
Williams J. concludes that a planned caesarean would be in JP’s best inter-
ests, despite her consistently expressing the desire for a vaginal birth. The
judge implicitly draws on the unwisdom of choosing a birth plan that
invites physical and emotional pain.95 Cobb J. in Mental Health Trust v
DD also uses an outcome-based determination of best interests to authorise
sterilisation of DD, overturning her repeated resistance to contraceptive
treatment and third-party interventions. DD was at high risk of life-
threatening complications if she fell pregnant again (she had six children
in a short span of time). On that basis, Cobb J. authorised forcible sterilisa-
tion in her best interests, as this would ultimately bring about the “normal
life”, free from third-party intrusion, that DD so desired.96
90 [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam), [2014] Fam. Law 1249.
91 Cf. S. Gilmore and J. Herring, “‘No’ Is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy” (2011)
12 C.F.L.Q. 3.
92 S. Choudhry, “Best Interests in the MCA 2005 – What can Healthcare Law Learn from Family Law?”
(2008) 16 Health Care Analysis 240.
93 [2019] EWCOP 23, [2019] C.O.P.L.R. 298.
94 [2015] EWCOP 4.
95 [2019] EWCOP 23, at [42]. JP had eventually managed a natural birth before the judgment was
finalised, leading Williams J. to reflect at [48] that: “The capacity for individuals to confound judges’
assessments is a reminder (to me at least) of the gap between probability and actuality.”
96 At [113]. This controversial case also involves numerous troubling assumptions around gender and
learning disability: see C. Kong, “Constructing Female Sexual and Reproductive Agency in Mental
Capacity Law” (2019) 66 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 101488.
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3. The decision is unwise for its outcomes for P’s welfare 2
The jurisprudence demonstrates alternative framings wherein “objective”
values can steer a best interests determination even if this contradicts
what evidently would be P’s values. We can exemplify this first with
Baker J.’s decision in Re M.97 This is the first case providing a determin-
ation on the lawfulness of continued treatment (nutrition and hydration)
of a person in a minimally conscious state.98 Evidence was accepted that
Mrs. M had expressed a clear view that her preferred course of action
would be non-treatment in the circumstances that had materialised.
Nevertheless, Baker J. holds that treatment should be continued in her
best interests, suggesting that for her values to determine the situation,
she would need an applicable advance decision under sections 24–26
MCA. This is particularly demanding given that she had suffered the
brain damage four years before the MCA’s formal requirements concerning
advance decisions came into force. It shows that while the court may be
bound to set aside the “objective” value of continued life, this will not
be as (what might be framed as) an “unwise” best interests decision.
Avoiding “unwise” outcomes is also apparently possible where P’s own
reasoning and values seem internally/mutually inconsistent. Here the
default decision becomes the “wise” one. For example, A NHS Trust v
Dr. A,99 again heard by Baker J., concerned a man who was refusing
food as a hunger strike to avoid deportation. Baker J. clearly views this
as unwise, stating: “In this context, where the consequences of a decision
will be fatal for Dr. A, the court must in my view be particularly careful
not to treat him as incapable of making a decision merely because the deci-
sion is extremely unwise.”100
Dr. A’s decision-making was hampered by contradictions in his own rea-
soning and beliefs: sometimes saying he wanted to die;101 sometimes hold-
ing apparently inconsistent wishes on this;102 sometimes not wanting to die
but recognising it as an acceptable and necessary consequence;103 and
sometimes expressing happiness that he had not been allowed to die.104
The case demonstrates how a “wise” default (namely, a life-saving inter-
vention) may both underpin and circumscribe the final decision on best
97 Re M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam). This case cited and discussed with approval the reasoning in Re P
[2009] EWHC 163 (Ch).
98 A. Mullock, “Deciding the Fate of a Minimally Conscious Patient: An Unsatisfactory Balancing Act?W
v M and Others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam)” (2012) 20 Med.L.R. 460.
99 [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP), [2014] 2 W.L.R. 607. Notably, Dr. A was also being treated under the
Mental Health Act 1983, s. 3.
100 Ibid., at [34].
101 Ibid., at [10].
102 Ibid., at [15].
103 Ibid., at [16].
104 Ibid., at [18].
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interests, in a way that could not (in principle) apply where a decision is
being made by a capacitous person.
B. The Underlying Normative Concept of Wisdom
Superficially, it is easy to assume that the disparate meaning and normative
function of unwise decisions in judicial rationalisations indicates incoherent
reasoning and conceptual ambiguities, in turn suggesting a problematic jus-
tificatory grounding for certain capacity assessments and best interests deci-
sions. However, the unclear normativity of “wisdom” might be attributable
to a key but subtle tension between the legislative intent of the phrasing as
discussed in Section II and the normative ideal of wisdom that prevails in
ordinary and theoretical conceptualisations. The parliamentary debates
foreground how the MCA’s principled basis was designed to make personal
decision-making as person-centric as possible; placing the individual’s
wishes, feelings, beliefs and values at the forefront so that regardless of cir-
cumstance, disability or impairment, she is on an equal footing with every-
one else.
The normative idea of wisdom, by contrast, brings explanatory value to
the more demanding justificatory criteria around reasoning and decisional
outcomes in judicial rationalisations, creating a conceptual wedge between
(what is viewed as) objectively “best” or “wise” decisions and the person’s
subjective wishes. Prevalent commonsense notions of wisdom often appeal
to a substantively rich understanding of decision-making with roots origin-
ating from a long philosophical tradition.105 Recent wisdom studies com-
bine philosophical and lay intuitions to elucidate the normative cognitive,
affective and motivational features of wisdom, including the accumulation
of experience, understanding, reflection, problem-solving capacities and the
motivation to make good choices in light of complex human problems.106
Through folk theories and experimental psychology, these studies often
treat wisdom as an “expert skill” that requires faculties of character and
intellect,107 whilst its substantive characterisations emphasise balancing
different interpersonal and extrapersonal interests, and adapting to new
and existing environments.108 As an expression of certain values and a par-
ticular ethical orientation towards life,109 its demanding characteristics
include “deep and broad insight into self, others, and the world”, “complex
105 N.M. Weststrate, S. Bluck and J. Glück, “Wisdom of the Crowd: Exploring People’s Conceptions of
Wisdom” in R.J. Sternberg and J. Glück (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Wisdom (Cambridge
2019), 97–121.
106 V. Tiberius and J. Swartwood, “Wisdom Revisited: A Case Study in Normative Theorizing” (2011)
14 Philosophical Explorations 283.
107 J. Swartwood, “Wisdom as an Expert Skill” (2013) 16 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 511.
108 Weststrate, Bluck and Glück, “Wisdom of the Crowd: Exploring People’s Conceptions of Wisdom”; R.
J. Sternberg, “Foolishness” in R. Sternberg and J. Jordan (eds.), A Handbook of Wisdom: Psychological
Perspectives (Cambridge 2005), 344–46.
109 Swartwood, “Wisdom as an Expert Skill”.
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emotion regulation” and “a motivational orientation that is transcending
self-interest and is invested in the well-being of others and the world”.110
As such, wisdom is thought to embody traits in action as well as the ability
to identify its instantiation in a manner that echoes aesthetic judgment, thus
potentially revealing a hierarchy of wisdom, ranging from common, every-
day pragmatic action, to that which is uncommon and transcendent.111
It is not immediately clear how these substantive characterisations of
wisdom track the normative presuppositions within judicial rationalisations
around the wisdom/unwisdom of reasoning or decisional outcomes. But
closer examination of the philosophical origin of wisdom studies in
Aristotle proves more illuminating, highlighting core deliberative features
of practical wisdom which encompass both the logic of a particular ration-
ality and the outcome of decisions. For Aristotle, practical wisdom is the
mark of the individual who “deliberate[s] well about what is good and
expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what
sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of
things conduce to the good life in general”.112
This person of practical wisdom is “capable of aiming in accordance with
calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action” and is not
“concerned with universals only – it must also recognize particulars”.113
Deliberative manifestations of practical wisdom therefore involve both
the ability to determine means to an end (or basic instrumental rationality) –
“the attainment of particular formed objectives” – as well as the ability to
specify constituents of an end, thereby answering “questions of general
policy – what specific objectives to form”.114 Or to use the broad categories
of judicial rationalisation, deliberative features of Aristotelian wisdom are
bound up with both the specific outcome of decisions as well as the rational
logic as required by the decision itself.
In this fairly expansive definition, Aristotle addresses the type of delib-
eration that involves considering the overarching human good, reflecting
on the good life as a whole, and the more particularistic kind that instanti-
ates the good as appropriate to the circumstances. For example, having a
generalised picture of the good in life and the role of generosity in life
as a whole helps determine when it is appropriate to give and to whom.
Without a vision of what the point is of one’s actions, one ends up like a
“sturdy body stumbling for want of sight”.115 Skills of perception enable
110 W.S. Brown, “Discussion: Seven Pillars of the House of Wisdom” in Sternberg and Jordan, A
Handbook of Wisdom, 18.
111 Ibid.
112 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Princeton
1984), NE 1140a43.
113 Ibid., at 1141b9.
114 D. Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason” in A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics
(Berkeley 1980), 37.
115 R. Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’ in Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 206.
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one to perceive and identify what is important, relevant and when.116 These
perceptual skills are inculcated through the habituation of character so that
one learns to desire and be motivated towards what is possible for a human
life in its distinctive functioning. Equally, practical wisdom demands devel-
oping the intellectual virtues associated with the ability to reason and reflect
in ways that recognise the constituent goods that promote what is possible
and desirable in human life.
Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom is therefore rooted in a substan-
tive but indeterminate vision of appropriate goods and ends for human
beings, and how one should deliberate towards these. Deliberative features
of wisdom are not value-neutral, wholly subjective or premised on an
impartial stance towards values, nor are they reducible to appetite, percep-
tual or cognitive traits. Rather, emotional, perceptual and intellectual skills
work in concert to promote a certain vision of the good human life and the
goods that constitute that goodness–though these nonetheless remain fairly
underspecified.117 Unlike contemporary wisdom studies, Aristotle lacks a
concrete characterisation of what the human good looks like. But this
very indeterminacy represents a key deliberative feature of practical wis-
dom. What constitutes the good by nature lacks any fixity: what is appro-
priate will depend on the suitability of the proposed course of action as
determined by the context-specific circumstances.118 The impossibility of
adopting or appealing to a clear rule to suit every case makes situational
appreciation a constitutive feature of what it means to be practically
wise; deliberation will be responsive and particularistic.119
Through an Aristotelian lens, the justificatory grounding of judicial
appeals to wisdom/unwisdom need not appear inconsistent or arbitrary,
but rather may be said to track a powerful intuition that practical wisdom
manifests itself through certain deliberative features, such as coherent rea-
soning that is responsive to context, circumstance and actively promotes
certain outcomes or goods in one’s decision-making. Aristotle’s account
thus has descriptive value in its elucidation of the common, if relatively
inchoate, normative grounding for the conceptual wedge between a per-
son’s subjective choices and best interests decisions in judicial rationalisa-
tions. Much less than a groundless espousal of random or arbitrary
judgments, such rationalisations can be seen to draw upon a more substan-
tively rich understanding of how decision-making could be approached,
whether by a person on her own behalf or by (say) a judge for P.
116 We set aside the substantial debate about the extent to which wisdom involves intellectual as opposed to
perceptual skills within Aristotle.
117 Aristotle ultimately endorses the political and philosophic life, but this has not prevented interpreters to
read a more expansive definition of the good life in Aristotle’s philosophy.
118 See M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
(Cambridge 1986).
119 Ibid., at 305.
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Whilst this conceptualisation of wisdom has explanatory potential in its
illumination of how the substantive ideal chafes against legislative intent, it
also raises difficult questions around the justificatory function of such stan-
dards within the MCA. The Aristotelian emphasis on deliberative flexibility
and indeterminate practical goods may suggest a perspective that is sympa-
thetic to the liberal commitment to value pluralism, individual expression
and incommensurability.120 However, even within Aristotle’s broad con-
straints, motivational, perceptual and intellectual virtues are highly
demanding prerequisites to wisdom: individuals must desire what is good
and appropriate, possess the ability to perceive and identify relevant fea-
tures of what is good in the circumstances and accumulate sufficient experi-
ence to eventually judge and reflect on their lives as a whole. Not only
would practical wisdom constitute an exacting bar for most individuals to
attain–possibly making it even more challenging for those with cognitive
impairments–but its prerequisites constitute a (potentially) controversial
value basis on which to judge the choices of others; an outcome that
would counter the liberal commitments within legislative intent, as
explained above.
C. Irreconcilable Tensions?
Bringing together the legislative debates and more normative accounts of
wisdom lays bare two interpretive but conflicting pathways to interpreting
the operation of principles in sections 1(4) and 1(5) in relation to specific
decisions. The first promotes a thin liberal interpretation of unwise that
places P’s subjective wishes at its heart. The second, more substantive
approach implicitly draws on more philosophical accounts and common
folk intuitions and subjects a person’s wishes, and indeed, the reasoning
and content of decisions, to a higher level of scrutiny. Judicial rationalisa-
tions confirm that a consistently understood legal definition and usage of
unwise decisions remains elusive, similar to that of best interests.
Conceptual and policy interpretations of unwise/wise help pinpoint some
reasons behind this inconsistency. Appeals to unwise decisions in section
1(4) adhere more closely to liberal commitments to subjective freedom,
yet the typical markers of best interests in judicial interpretations of sections
1(5) and 4 – decisions that are rational, practicable, etc. – involve cognate
concepts of a substantive vision of wisdom. Whilst there is acknowledge-
ment that capacitous persons should be allowed to make unwise decisions,
judicial rationalisations suggest discomfort with adopting a thin criterion in
best interests and abandoning a more normative vision of wise deliberation
in making decisions for P. This normative vision guides not just how P’s
120 Ibid. and Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason”. For alternative readings, see C.D.C. Reeve,
Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford 1992); T.H. Irwin, Aristotle’s First
Principles (Oxford 1989); R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton 1991).
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subjective wishes may be evaluated, but also potentially how judges them-
selves are to deliberate in determining best interests.121
The concept of wisdom/unwisdom is therefore characterised by inherent
instability between the “thin” liberal interpretation and “thicker”, more nor-
mative connotations. As such, the contested domain of unwise decisions
represents a real test of commitment to the person’s values, both in capacity
assessment (does it protect expressions of individual personality or act as an
alert of incapacity?) and best interests decision-making (should presump-
tive weight be accorded to P’s “unwise” values or does it legitimate the
meta-examination of such values in light of some human good?).
Arguably, this highlights the need for a concrete legal definition of wisdom
which preserves either legislative intent or idealised content in a consistent,
general manner. If the former, the legislative genealogy of section 1(4)
points to the protection of individual expression and eccentricity as a matter
of exercising autonomy–a normative agenda aligned with the demand for
exclusively person-centric decisions in Article 12 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which, at least in
the Committee’s General Comment, stresses the determinative weight of
the person’s subjective values, wishes and feelings, regardless of
capacity.122
Yet, as shown above, divesting the normative connotations of wisdom
has proven highly difficult in practice. The manner in which wisdom and
its cognates function in judicial rationalisations gestures towards inchoate
criteria of the types of thinking, reasoning, values that warrant certain
moral standing, and in turn, the weight that should be accorded to P’s
views in best interests determinations. The counterintuitive usage of unwise
in section 1(4) remains prone to ambiguity and appears too weak to offset
the more pervasive, normatively-laden notions of wisdom that creep into
judicial rationalisation. Although it is of limited reach in its detail or
intended application, the presumptive value of wise decisions continues
to invite implicitly the critical assessment of an individual’s decisions,
measuring her own value perspective both in capacity assessment and
best interests decision-making, and indeed often leading to a conflation
of the two. In contrast, preserving the more idealised grounding of wisdom
provides some justificatory basis for precisely this type of
121 As Suzanne Doyle Guilloud has pointed out to us, different judicial perspectives and reasoning may be
judged as including ‘unwiseness’ from the perspective of other judges: e.g. Guys and St Thomas v R
[2020] EWCOP 4, at [56], Hayden J. holds: “It is, I think, important to acknowledge, as others have
done, that judges in the past may have strained to conclude that women, in these difficult circumstances,
lacked decision making capacity in order, for the highest of motives, to protect the life or health of both
the mother and her unborn child. To give the mother’s articulated position this very limited interpret-
ation would, on careful reflection, be sophistry, designed to enable me to protect the mother and her
unborn child without confronting what I consider to be the true evidential picture.”
122 CRPD Committee, “General Comment No. 1”. Though we have serious reservations about the contro-
versial General Comment interpretation of Article 12, the ethos of putting P at the centre of decision-
making nonetheless lies at the heart of the CRPD.
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meta-examination of P’s values in the best interests test; something that
judicial rationalisations wish to retain. In theory, this would make explicit
the values basis for certain best interest decisions, though at the expense of
according absolute priority to P’s own values and their idiosyncratic
expression.
Whether one favours preserving legislative intent or the normative ideal,
attempts to coalesce around a generalised, concrete legal definition of wis-
dom run contrary to its very meaning. Using the concept of wisdom to
achieve judicial consistency would be an odd strategy; especially as wis-
dom’s core normative feature involves skills to navigate context-specificity
and indeterminacy as opposed to uniform rule application. Indeed, the best
interests standard tracks such indeterminacy: section 1(5), as explicated in
section 4, outlines the legal obligation to make decisions in unique, unre-
peatable circumstances; such indeterminacy is constitutive of the duties
that are owed. Drawing on generalised, rule-driven terms runs counter to
the requirements of wisdom, but also the very aims and obligations of
the legislation.
Moreover, a generalised approach seems fundamentally problematic
from the standpoint of judicial logic. From different angles, the conceptual
instability of wisdom within the MCA presents a dilemma: if the liberal
intent of “unwise” in section 1(4) likewise holds in the best interests stand-
ard, judges would need to prioritise P’s subjective wishes and feelings and
could not claim that best interests excludes unwise decisions. This suggests
that the best interests standard is judged by the same, minimal criteria of
section 1(4), where P’s subjective choices are presumptively weighted
regardless of capacity. But the danger is that this leaves a poorly anchored,
subjectivist notion of best interests incapable of providing nuanced deci-
sions in context-specific and often ethically-fraught circumstances.123
Achieving consistent judicial logic across the principles expounded in sec-
tions 1(4) and 1(5) is bought at the expense of the best interests standard
itself. However, judicial rationalisations that draw on divergent notions of
wisdom and its cognates in section 1(4) and in the detail of interpreting sec-
tions 1(5) and 4 may avoid the overly subjectivist slant to the best interests
standard. This then represents an entrenched discretionary dimension to
such judicial decisions, with dangers of inconsistency, unpredictability
and, in some cases, the failure to promote P-centric judgments; indeed,
as forewarned in Parliament, it risks D’s subjective values being the deter-
minative factor in decision-making.
Our analysis does not lead to a determination for or against either inter-
pretation: it remains possible that best interests decisions that follow one or
123 See C. Kong, “The Significance of Strong Evaluation and Narrativity in Supporting Capacity” in
M. Donnelly, R. Harding and E. Taşcıoğlu (eds.), Supporting Legal Capacity in Socio-legal Context
(Hart forthcoming 2021).
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the other could be disputed and questioned on multiple grounds. But we
have shown that the MCA, coupled with the idiosyncratic and sometimes
contradictory appeal to unwise decisions in case law, invites the simultan-
eous consideration of and abstraction from P’s values and wishes. It is
tempting to condemn more substantive judicial rationalisations which
appeal to wisdom and its cognates as legally baseless; as instances of judi-
cial overreach and paternalism. However, this overlooks how appeals to
higher-order reasons in deliberating best interests track powerful, more nor-
mative accounts around practical wisdom, highlighting the slightly counter-
intuitive nature of the liberal interpretation of unwise as propounded in the
parliamentary debates. The widespread, intuitive appeal of such normative
accounts cannot be so easily dismissed.
At a minimum, our analysis calls into question the suitability of provid-
ing for the principled aims of section 1(4) on the terms through which the
subsection is formulated. Our argument shows that the MCA’s principled
bases compound rather than allow coherent resolution of the Act’s inherent
principled tensions. The MCA is intended to put the person to whom it
applies at the centre of decisions. But its framing has the effect of further
entangling and obscuring the impacts of “objective” versus “subjective”
as proxies for less clearly stated principles to arrive at better – if not the
best possible – decisions: it creates an unavoidably unstable foundation
for differential accounts of the better determination by or for the person.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has shown how the principles in sections 1(4) and 1(5) cannot
stand together as foundational precepts for the MCA’s sound operation and
its realisation of P-centric objectives. The tensions between them are irre-
concilable and individually they fail to reconcile imperatives that arise
both in relation to our understandings of capacitous decisions and of
what values should inform best interests determinations. What initially
strikes one as arbitrariness in judicial rationalisations is an inevitable con-
sequence of such contrary imperatives within the legislation, operating
within the context of prevalent assumptions around practical wisdom.
Theorisations of wisdom bring powerful explanatory potential to how the
law can and should operate, but also expose the flaws in a bald statutory
provision that ties itself to unwisdom and which inevitably comes to oper-
ate too in conjunction with cognates such as irrationality and eccentricity.
Paradoxically, the application of the MCA thereby leads to abstractions
from specific decisions. In so doing, instead of promoting its very core prin-
ciple – placing the person at the heart of consideration – it has the opposite
effect: the principled distancing of the person from decisions that are
intended to ensure she is at their centre.
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